As agents continue to apprehend more known, suspected terrorists (KSTs) illegally entering the U.S., internal federal agency processes have allowed them to enter the U.S. and “potentially threaten national security and public safety,” an Office of Inspector General report found.

The OIG, which audited the Department of Homeland Security, the agency created in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks tasked with defending Americans from terrorism, identified ineffective practices and highlighted an example of a known terrorist being released into the U.S. after illegally entering in Yuma, Arizona. The KST was caught only through a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) airport screening in California when trying to board a plane en route to Tampa, Florida.

The OIG report found that a KST was released because of U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s “ineffective practices and processes for resolving inconclusive matches with the Terrorist Watchlist led to multiple mistakes.”

The Terrorist Screening Dataset (TSDS), referred to as the Terrorist Watchlist, is the federal database that contains sensitive information on terrorist identities, CBP explains. It originated as a consolidated terrorist watchlist “to house information on known or suspected terrorists (KSTs) but evolved over the last decade to include additional individuals who represent a potential threat to the United States, including known affiliates of watchlisted individuals.”

The OIG audit also found that after the KST was identified, it took two weeks for Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents to make an arrest because of “multiple challenges sharing information.”

The OIG recommended that CBP resolve its inconclusive terrorist watchlist matching process and that ICE improve its internal mechanisms to more effectively implement removal and enforcement operations. It made three recommendations, with which DHS agreed.

Jim Crumpacker, CFE director with the Department of the Government Accountability Office-Office of Inspector General Liaison Office, expressed concerns about the report’s title, saying it “misleads readers into believing that CBP knowingly released” a known or suspected terrorist. He also said the report “mischaracterizes how and when the individual’s location was identified.”

The OIG disagreed, stating CBP releasing a KST “is accurate and supported in the report findings. The report explains that CBP released [the KST] without sharing information that would have confirmed the Terrorist Watchlist match.”

The 24-page redacted report explains that the Department of Homeland Security’s process to protect Americans from potential terrorists includes screening, arresting and removing foreign nationals who threaten national security. To do this, agents in CBP’s National Targeting Center (NTC) coordinate with Border Patrol agents to provide the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) with information to determine if foreign nationals are in the TSDS. Agents also interview foreign nationals and perform other criminal background checks. The TSA also screens everyone before boarding domestic flights to ensure they aren’t on the TSDS. The law requires ICE agents to arrest foreign nationals identified as KSTs and process them for removal.

The report describes how one KST fell through the cracks. On April 17, 2022, a group presenting as a family unit in Yuma, Arizona, was screened by Border Patrol agents. One, who was determined to be an “inconclusive” Terrorist Watchlist match, was released two days later.

Four days after entering the U.S., the individual was flagged by TSA at the Palm Springs International Airport in California, identified as a known, suspected terrorist. It took another two weeks for ICE agents to arrest the KST on May 6, 2022.

One of the problems the OIG identified is that CBP sent a request to its Tactical Terrorism Response Team to interview the KST but sent it to the wrong email address so the interview never happened. CBP also gained information from an international partner about the KST but never forwarded it to the FBI. Two CBP officials told the OIG they “did not recall” why they didn’t forward the information. The report doesn’t state if they face disciplinary charges or were fired.

One Yuma official told the OIG he was unable to respond quickly to email because he was busy processing a flood of illegal foreign nationals into the country with a station at capacity. The agent released the individual without checking if the NTC and TSC had exchanged information to confirm a positive KST match.

Another problem the OIG found is that ICE agents requested the KST’s file – but didn’t receive it for 8 days – through the mail. Despite the individual’s file showing prior acts of violence, the individual was still released into the country.

“CBP missed multiple opportunities to help the TSC verify the migrant was a positive Terrorist Watchlist match before releasing the migrant,” OIG concluded. “CBP’s ineffective practices resulted in sending an interview request to an incorrect email address, obtaining but not sharing information requested by the TSC, and releasing the migrant before CBP finished coordinating with the TSC. If CBP’s ineffective practices for resolving inconclusive Terrorist Watchlist matches continue, the component risks releasing individuals into the United States who potentially threaten national security and public safety.”

The report was published after more than 8 million illegal border crossers have entered the U.S. from over 170 countries since January 2021. Among them are at least 1.7 million people who evaded capture. DHS has no idea if they are KSTs, who, or where they are.

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This article was published by Center Square and is reproduced with permission.